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INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AT THE WTO 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For lawyers, the study of international law is often frustrating 
for its distinct lack of a court system. The institution of law exists, 
but there are rarely neutral arbitrators to amwunce the content of 
the rules or declare that a government has violated the law. 
Rather, it is up to the disputing parties lo decide whether a breach 
has occurred and what remedy, if any, is available. As if this was 
not difficult enough, where international courts do exist, 
govenu·nents have the habit of resisting the courts' jurisdiction or 
ignoring their rulings. International law skeptics ask whether, 
given such a system of unilateral rather than centralized 
enforcement, international law can properly be called law a t  all. 
Advocates of international law genera11y point skeptics to one 
notable exception-the quasj-judicial system of the World Trade 
Organization ("WTO''). Within this trade agreement, the member 
governments have established a set of procedures, embodied in the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") agreement, whereby a 
neutral judicial panel with compulsory jurisdiction over claims 
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brought by mt·mber governments has the exclusive power to 
decide when violations of the agreement have occurred, and sets 
out the remedy for violations. Thus far, governments have 
generally abided by the terms of Lhe DSU agreernen t. The success 
of the WTO in cstablishi11g a multllaleral dispute scttle1nent system 
has led to significant political and scholarly attention. Diplomats 
and trade negotiators have referred to the DSU as the "crovvn 
jewel" of the \NTO system. International law scholars have 
developed varying hypotheses lo expl21in the success of the trade 
institution. In this Article, T discuss whe1t the DSU has 
accomplished in terms of enforcing trade ru !es through a 
multilateral process, In doing so, I want to highlight both the 
successes of the institution in curtailing unilateralism- but also its 
limits. Both are significant. 
Given the special fonn<�t of this issue, I take for gwnted that the 
reader has smne knowledge of the WTO system. This brief Article 
begins in Secbon 2 with a short background to the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT") and WTO dispute 
settlement systems (other n1ore detailed analyses o£ the evolution 
of the trade system are easily available elsewhere). In Section 3" I 
discuss how a rnulblatcral syste1n aJ1.d unilateral system of trade 
enforcement coexisted under the GATT regime. Governments 
could seek multilateral resolution of trade disputes through the 
GATT system, but governments (particularly the United States) 
often chose to make and enforce their own determinations of 
whether another government had bteached a trade agreement. By 
contrast, the major innovation of the WTO system is that 
governments have agreed that the DSU will be the exdLtsive means 
to enforce trade law. Governments are to cease the unilateral 
enforcement of WTO rules. 
In Section 4, I analyze how the instit1Jtional design of the DSU 
impacts its goal of supplanting unilateral 1neans of trade 
enforcement. Specifically, I examine how the DSU system only 
provides a prospective remedy-that is, the DSU permits 
retaliation only for injuries that take place after the conclusion of 
WTO litigation determining whether a breach occurred. The DSU 
thus immunizes violations of WTO trade law from retaliatory 
sanctioning so long as the offending measures are withdrawn at 
the end of the litigation process, which is often several years later. 
This immunity, which I refer to as the "stall-and-withdraw" 
loophole} leaves injured governments with no inlmediate remedy 
for WTO violations under the DSU system, regardless o.f how great 
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the trade effects of the violation are . .In this Section, I suggest that 
the institutional design of the DSU effectively creates a need for the 
unilateral enforcement of trade rules and, oddly, provides legal 
protection for unilateral sanctions. 1 conclude by atternpting to 
provide a vievv of the DSU that acknowledges its advances from its 
origins in the GATT regime but also acknowledges its inability to 
completely control unilateral retaliation. 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GATT AND Vv'TO DiSPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 
A full account of the evolution of international trade law from 
the GATT to the current \NTO regime cannot be captured in this 
Article. lt  is a rich history involving changing views of economic 
growth theory, -international security concerns, contentious 
domestic politics, experimentation in legal institutio.nal design, and 
changing environmental and public health demc-1nds, among many 
other influences. Below I provide a brief account of the events and 
political demands that led to the creation of the DSU. 
Following the end of World War H, the victorious wartime 
allies began to negotiate a rnullilateral agreement to govern 
international trade rules. The h·ade negotiations lasted from 1946 
to 1948 and culmi11ated in the drafting of the International Trade 
Organization ("ITO") Charter-a 1nultilateral agreement on the 
trade in goods. The ITO was to have a sophisticated organizational 
structure thC'lt included submission of all trade disputes to the 
United Nations' Interrtational Court of Justice. The ITO, however, 
failed to come into existence, because it failed to gain sufficient 
poHtical support in the United States Senate. Once it became clear 
that the Senate would not ratify the agreement, other governments 
had little interest in bringing the treaty into force. The failure of 
the ITO effectively eliminated the prospect of a formal dispute 
settlement system in international trade law. Without the ITO, the 
opeTative treaty governing trade relations became the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade CGATT") agreement, a skeletal 
agreement that was negotiated as an interim measure to lower 
tariff levels. Unlike the ITO, the GATT agreement did not have an 
organizational structure: there was not a formal organizabonal 
body, there were no provisions for future trade negotiations, and 
there were no procedures for the resolution of disputes. A trade 
system was born without a formal set of procedures for enJorcing 
trade law. 
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As is well documented by Robert Hudec and others, a dispute 
settlement system eventually developed in the GATT regime that 
was a rnix of legal analysis and diplomacy. The dispute settlement 
system evolved ovet· the life of the GATT regime (and smne o[ its 
practices changed significantly), but it can nevertheless be 
described in broad strokes. Trade disputes were supposed to be 
subtnitted to arbitration, which consisted of a panel of three 
arbitralors selected by the parties. The arbitrators would decide if 
there was a trade violation and submit a report to the GATT 
goven1n1ents. The governments could then adopt the report and, if 
the panel found a violation, authorize the complaining party to 
retaliate against the respondent government. 
While this systen1. st�ems quite legal in principle, we n1ust 
examine its political aspects to understand how the GATT system 
operated in practice. Dispute settlement worked on a consensus 
system-that is, every party to the GATT agreement had to agree, 
or at least not object, to any action by the GATT body. rhus each 
step of the dispute resolution process had to meet the consensus 
requirement. Both the complaining govenunent and the 
respondent government had to agree to the formation of a panel to 
hear the dispute, the selection of the arbitrators, a11d the adoption 
of the report by the GATT parties. In short, the respondent 
government collld veto the process at several different points -at 
which time the legal case would, [or most intents and purposes, 
simply cease. Yet parties often did not veto the panel process. In 
the later days of the GATT regime, the parties mutually agreed not 
to block the formation of a panel, but respondent governments 
could still slow the process significantly and retained the ability to 
block the adoption of the report. 
For all its institutional weakness, the GATT systen1 worked 
fairly well as a diplom,atic dispute settlement system. When 
governments were politically open to settling the dispute, the 
GATT system provided a neutral arbitration process. Cmnplaining 
governments could also raise awareness of other states' poor trade 
practices even ii the legal case never advanced forward. In the 
end, the GATT syste1n did a surprisingly good job of dispute 
resolution given its procedural limitations. 
The GATT system of dispute resolution was intended to be the 
exclusive means of determining whether a violation of the 
agreement had occurred, but it was not. In practice, the GATT 
system coexisted with a unilateral system of trade law 
enforcement. Given the ineffectiveness of GATT in dealing with 
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politically sensitive breaches of trade law, governments started 
enforcing i_nternational trade rules on their ow11. For exan1ple, the 
United States government famousiy began using an exclusively 
domestic decision-making process to determine whether other 
governments were violating GATT trade rules or otherwise h-ading 
in ways the United States government deemed "unfair." The 
United States government would unilatcral1y impose h-ade 
sanctions when it fow1d violations. These measures were called 
''Section 301" actions, after the section of the 1974 Ttade Act that 
authorized the executive to apply these sanctions_1 As the sole 
judge, the United States, unsurprisingly1 was quick to find that 
other states were breaching the GATT while never finding its own 
questiona b1e trade measures were violations. 
The United Stales government was able to maintain this system 
of unilateral enforcement of  trade law without significant fear of 
retaliation (with the exception of the European Communities 
(" EC") and son1etimes Japan) primarily because access to the 
American market was rnore important to U.S. trading partners 
than any one export n1arket was to the United States. Restated, the 
size of the United States market made exclusion from this market 
very costly to an economicaJly smaller nation's exporters, but the 
smaller size of the other nation's 1narket made exclusion from its 
markets only moderately costly to A_merican exporters. While the 
United States was not the only country to take such measures- the 
EC similarly had the authority under its law to sanction violations 
of international b·ade law-U.S. Section 301 actions caused 
significant consternation abroad. Other governn1ents charged that 
the United States was acting "unilaterally"- using access to the 
U.S. market to attack other governments' policies while refusing to 
alter its own breaches of trade law. 
ln advance of the GAIT's Uruguay Round-the 1982-1994 
round of trade negotiations that established the WTO 
agreements-the participating govern.rnents agreed that the 
current system of dispute resolution needed to be reformed. Even 
the U.S. Congress was pressing the executive branch to negotiate a 
stricter system of international trade enforcement. Although all of 
the governments were repeating the mantra of reform, their 
political goals were vastly different. Most governments wanted 
the United States to abandon its practice of tmilaterally enforcing 
t Sec Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006) (outlining the actions of U.S. 
trade representatives). 
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its own interpretation of trade law, whi.le the U.S. Congress wanted 
the rest of the world to approve (and thus stop objechng to) its 
Section 301 process. During the negotiations, the United States 
executive branch pushed for a quasi-court system: an arbitration 
body (1) t.haf could adjudicate complatnts on a strict ti1ne schedule 
and (2) whose decisions would be automatically enforced through 
trade sanctions. Other goven1n1ents were more ::;keptica l of such a 
legalized process, preferring instead the existing GATT approach 
with. its emphasis on diplo1nacy; these governrnents ·were 
pritnarlly concerned with curtailing the U.S. government's use of 
Section 301. 
To address these concerns, the governrnents participating in 
lhe Uruguay Rolrnd created the World Trade Organization as a 
framework agreement and embodied the specific procedures for 
multilateral enforcen1ent of trade rules in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. The ultimate con1prornise on Lrade law 
enforcement includes strict time h1nits, wluch cannot be blocked by 
the respondent governments. The decisions of the arhi trahon 
panel are subject to review by a standing and independent 
Appellate Body and are then adopted by the WTO members 
(sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body). The Dispute Settle1nent 
Body adopts the reports by reverse consensus- that is, the report is 
adopted unless every men1ber government, including the wim1i.ng 
government, objecls to the decision. In return, the United States 
agreed to apply trade sanctions only if the new multilateral dispute 
settlement process determines that there is a violation. At its core_, 
the DSU requires that the United States forego its practice of 
unilateral trade enforcement in return for an effective tnultilateral 
process. 
As with most compromises, none of the par ties were entirely 
pleased with the DSU. Various governments objected that the new 
system was too litigious and gave insufficient deference to national 
trade policy goals. The U.S. Congress objected on different 
grounds. Members of Congress argued that the new system 
undermined state sovereignty and gutted the United States' ability 
to apply trade sanctions when it believed there vvas a violation of 
the b·ade agreement. 1nstead of negotiating the international 
system's approval of Section 3011 the executive had all but ended 
the program. Metnbers of Congress threatened to reject the DSU 
agreement, but eventually accepted the DSU system as part of the 
package of WTO trade concessions. 
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ln Section-�, l discuss hm,v the DSU is not the exclusive means 
by which govern ments seek to enforce VVTO trade rules. A system 
of unilateral enforcement cm1tinues to <::>xist alongside the 
multilateral S\'Stem. Bul before we Lmderstand the lim.itations of 
the DSU, in particular the way in which the DSU as an insUtution 
effectively permits (and perh21ps encour21gcs) retaliation outside of 
ils fre1mework, vve need to discuss the structul'e of the DSU system. 
3. TH S i IV1 PACT OF THE DSU ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
TRADE RULES 
The core of the DSU agreement can be summed up as follows: 
rncrnbcr states have pron1ised to subordinate their right to retaliate 
legally for the illegal act of another government to WTO 
21rbitration. The arbitration covers both whether a breach has 
occurred, and, if so, the extent to which the complaining 
government can retaliate. ln addilion, respondent governments 
have agreed to accept the decision of the arbitrator (be it a panel or 
the Appdlate Body) as Lo whelher its aclions are in breach of the 
agreement and thus will not counter-retaliate. To understand the 
significallce of this agreement, we first have to know how 
international law dispute .resolution works without such a 
procedural agreement. 
3.1. i\. Brief A1lnlysis of Public hzternntiorzal Law 
lntel'n8tional law is popularly viewed as significantly different 
them "real" domestic law because internabonal law lacks an 
entrenched systen1 of enforcement. International law has rules, but 
not necessarily a judicial system to enforce these rules. Given the 
special format of this issue, I offer a simplified description of the 
enforcement of international law in the absence of agreed upon 
dispute settlement rules. Governments can corrunit in a treaty to a 
system of rules, and the treaty forms the basis for international 
law- that is, legally binding rules between the parties to the treaty. 
There are various other ways to form international law (some of 
which are n1ore controversial), but I .focus here on treaties because 
treaty law is the basis of most international h·ade rules. Treaty law 
is formed when a group of governments ngree to a treaty text and 
ratify tllat text. The treaty is then international law, at least with 
regard to the parties to the treaty. 
The existence of the treaty, however, does not necessarily 1nean 
that lhere is a neutral, authoritative body to declare what the treaty 
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requires and whether one party has breached it. Rather, both 
governn1ents are equally valid interpreters of the treaty (and, thus, 
why governments almost never admit that they have violated 
international lavv even if they privately think a violation has 
occurred). The interested parties tl1emselves ar� equally 
21uthm·i talive judges. The parties could mutually agree to resolve 
the dispute by appointing a neutral arbitrator, but both p21rties 
have to consent. While governments son1etimes agree to do this, 
one party often refuses to consent £or various reasons, not the least 
of which is a distrust that the arbitrator will "correctly" interpret 
the treaty. 
Now thnt the treaty exists, let's say that one party takes an 
action that the other party considers to be a violation of the 
agreement. Government A believes that Government B has passed 
some domestic meast1re that breaches the treaty. Government B 
disagrees and clain1s thal its actions are perfectly consistent with 
the treaty. 
What will the governments do to resolve their dispute? We 
have a situation where two interpretations of the treaty exist. 
Government A can claim that the treaty was violated, and, under 
its interpretation, legally retaliate against Government B by 
breaching the agreement in a proportionate manner. Government 
B can then disagree that any violation occurred and, under its 
interpretation, declare that Government A's countern1easures are 
themselves a violation of treaty -one that Government B views as 
illegal because Govenu11ent B does not acknowledge that a 
preceding violation of the treaty ever occurred. This can continue 
in a spiral: Government B adopting countermeasures for 
Government A's violation, Government A then adopting 
additional countern1easures for Government B' s new ''illegal" 
response to its "legal" retaliation, and so on. In the context of trade 
law, the spiral is referred to as a "trade war." Obviously, disputes 
do not always spiral like this. The threat of a spiral can keep 
Goverrunent B from breaching initially, keep Government A fr01n 
retaJiati.ng in the first instance, keep Government B fron1 
responding to Government A's retaliation, or otherwise stop the 
fight at some later point. 
The frustration for 1awyers is that result of the dispute tends to 
be based on politics (who can hurt whom worse or who has the 
political will to stay in the tight longest), rather than the legal 
merits. The enforcement of international law is often an exercise in 
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political or econmnic power rather than an analysis of e;Kh 
government's legal argLLments. 
3.2. Rctuming to lutemutiont7! Trarfe Lnw 
Tt is against this backdrop that the GATT system operated - a 
system of international law enforcement where each governn1ent is 
able to rnaintain the correctness of its legal analysis 21nd 
unilaterally retal iate agG�inst peTceived violations. The DSU is 
significant becwse it moved beyond the clefault international law 
baseline. Governments have foregone their right to determine on 
their own whether another goven1n1ent has violated the WTO 
agreement. Consequently, the DSU can claim to have eliminated 
the dual interpretatiL)n problem. As I will discuss in Section 3, 
however, the institutional design of the DSU still permits unilateral 
retaliation and, thus, has not solved this issue completely. 
The GATT effectively let unilateral enforcement coexist vvitl1 its 
multilateral svstem. The GATT achieved notable successes in 
J 
establishing a systemc of netJ b·al dispute resolution, but  i t  was slow 
and could be effectively blocked by either party to a dispute. 
Consequently, the participating governments often resorted to 
unilateral determinations of what was a violation of international 
trade rules and unilateral enforcen1cnt of the agreement. 
Uni.lateral retaliation could (and sometimes did) descend into trade 
wars, although far nl.ore often led to more economically powerful 
governments imposing their views on less economically powerful 
governments. The differences i n  economic power allowed the U.S. 
government and the EC (as jts internal market i n tegrated i n  the 
later years of the GATT) to impose sanctions against thejr trading 
partners with sn1aller economies without n:mch fear of counter­
retaliation. Although urulateral trade enforcement was never 
explicitly permitted under the GATT regime, the weakness of the 
institution o-eated a situation where this was the open pracbce of 
some governments, even though many conunentators would say 
that unilateral retaliation under the GA TI was i l legaL 
The DSU has changed the GATT system i n  significant ways. If 
one member has allegedly breached a WTO agreen1ent, the 
mernbers of the WTO have agreed to constraints on their ability to 
breach (legally) the treaty in reply, claiming the other member's 
violation as the legal justification. The notable point for the " rule 
of law'' element is that the finding of breach is based upon the legal 
merits of the case rather than the relative economic power of the 
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parties. Of course, the influence of economic power remains: the 
decision to bring a case, the extent to which sanctions are effective, 
the cost of good legal representatio.n at the WTO and other 
advantages of economic power continue to influence the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Nonetheless, the DSU system is a rnore 
rule-based system than the previous GATT system. 
By ceding the authority to adjudicate trade disputes to an 
arbit.ra tion body, member governments have created a system of 
dispute resolution that is ostensibly based on legal rules rather 
than power, at least with regard to whether a government has or 
has not breached the agreement. ln practice, the DSU system 
works something like this: if Government A raises its tariff rates 
on cars coming from the terri tory of Governn1ent B and 
Governmenl B believes that this is a violation of the GATT 
agreem.ent (or another agreement in the WTO), then under 
international law rules, Government B may want to retaliate by 
breaching the agreement in a proportion(lte way- say, by raising 
the tariff rates on n1otorcycles coming from the lerritory of 
Government A. Whj}e under the GATT regime Government B 
could, as a matter of state practice, act unilatera!Jy or 
multilaterally, the DSU agreement explicitly requires that 
Government B receive authorization from the WTO before 
retaliating against Government A fot the retaliation to be legally 
justified. Restated, Government B' s retaliation is not itself a 
violation o f  the WTO agreement if it receives authorjzation for the 
retaliation through the DSU process. If the WTO finds that there 
was not a breach, then Government B cannot legally retaliate at  all. 
Thus for WTO members to claim the legal right to retaliate against 
others members' alleged breaches of the agreement, they n1ust fi.rst 
receive the approval of the WTO by going through DSU 
procedures. 
4. THE IMPORT ANT GAPS: RETALIATION OUTSIDE OF THE 
DSUPROCESS 
While the DSU is a significant development in international 
dispute settlement, the agreement has not successfully curtailed 
the unilateral enforcement international trade law as many 
scholars suggest. Governments can still adopt retaliatory trade 
policies- that is, punitive sanctions or a measure that mirrors the 
one about which they are complaining, although they can no 
longer claim that such aclions are legal. The DSU agreement links 
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the legality of retaliation to use of the \NTO dispute resolution 
proced ures. I�etaliation is  i l legal - even if proportionate - if i t  is 
based on a unilateral deter.mination of a violation. 
The interesti 11g element here is that the DSU institu t ion 
ejli!ctit1ely permits such i llegal retaliation because it immunizes both 
\'iolations and illegal retaliation to those viola lions for at least 
eighteen months (although tl1e time period is Jikelv to be much 
longer) - what I refer to as the II stall-and-wi thdraw'' loophole. r 
say ''effectively" because this is not the expl icit goal of the DSU, 
and i t  certainly does not match the text of the DSU. By its own 
term5, the DSU claims to have jurisdiction over all disputes 
rcg<lr\.1 ing almost al l  of the WTO agreements (the "coverled 
agreerncnts," in DSU terms), and states have agreed to give up 
unilc1teral retaliatio.n. Nevertheless, the institution.Jl design of the 
DSU permils governments more options i n  practice. ln fact, the 
fa ilure of the DSU design to provide a remedy during the li tigation 
process arguably creates an Incentive for governments to usc 
enforcement strategies that are formally proh ibited the WTO 
framework. This is where the institu tiona} design analysis and the 
legal ana lysis of the DSU text differ. My analysis is concerned with 
the institutional design elements. 
The DSU system effectively permits retaliation by providing 
govern.ments with legal immunity for their actions until such tiTne 
as the DSU adjudicatory system declares the action to be a 
violation. Under the terms of the DSU, governments cannot legally 
impose sanctions for violations of the agreement until  t hey have 
received a WTO finding o£ a breach. Then the WTO will only 
au thorize prospective sanctions, meaning sanctions from the time of  
the finding going forward into the future. Any econon1ic damage 
caused by the breach up until the WTO finding is not 
com pens a ted. 
A government can breach the WTO agreement m1.til the DSU 
litigation is complete and other governments are not legally 
permitted to retaliate. The m.inimllln time to complete the 
litigation process is eighteen months. This includes consultations, 
a panel hearing, an appeal and a reasonable period of time to 
comply. WTO l itigation may continue after this point, but then the 
complaining government can apply sanctions for the current 
negative trade effects if the offending measure is not re1noved 
(subject to an arbitration hearing on the level of sanctioning). 
Although the n1.inimum time is eighteen months, most litigation a t  
the WTO tnkes vears. For instance, Antigua continues to pursue a 
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case against the United States foT Cl violation of the Genera] 
Agreement on Trade in Services. Antigua formally began the 
.d ispute resolution process in March 2003. Retaliatory sanctions 
were not authorized until August 2005 - over two years after the 
cC�se was filed. Other cases have gone on for much longer. 
If a government removes the offending mee�sLu·e after the DSU 
proc�ss is completed, then other governments are not compensated 
no tnatter how much damage the measure has caused. Of course, 
the DSU text does not state that governments have imrnunjty froTTl 
sanctions until  the case is adjudicated. Quite the opposile: the 
DSU states that governments should cornply at all  times wilh their 
legal obiigations. lt  is here that an analysis of the text of the DSU 
and an analysis of lhe DSU' s institutional design lead i n  different 
directions. The legal text does not explicitly authorize government 
immunity for breaches of trade law during the DSU adjudication 
process, but the design of the institution creates a de facto free pass 
so long as the measure is withdrawn at the end of the l it igation. 
For instance, in March 2002, President Bush raised tariff rates 
on steel imports. Although President Bush claimed that this was 
legal under the WTO agreement, i t  was widely viewed as a 
violation of international trade rules by both domestic and foreign 
observers. Yet other nations were not allowed to retaliate Ltnder 
the DSU rules until the WTO' s Dispute Settlement Body declared 
this measure a vio.lation. When the WTO did forma l l y  declare the 
higher tariff rates a violation in December 2003, President Bush 
si1nply withdrew the measure. Blatantly using this o stall and 
withdraw" loophole, President Bush was able to violate the WTO 
agreements, and yet other governments were not permitted to 
retaliate against the United States for the damage caused. Other 
states ntay have altered their diplomatic posture towards the Bush 
adminish·ation during this time or there n1ay have been some 
reputational loss (although the impact and degree of reputational 
losses are controversial), but other governments were unable, if 
they abided by the legal strictures of the WTO, to reply in kind. 
Of course, other states can reply in kind. The con1plainlng 
governments do not claim that such retaliation is lega l - these 
governments will probably privately view such reta l iation as 
illegal under the WTO although the govenunents have absolutely 
no incentive to ever publicly admit to that- but unilateral 
retaliation remains within the range of policy choices for 
governments. The issue here is not just that states can violate 
international law, even procedural rules about addressing 
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violations. Rather, it is thal the insli lutional design of the DSU 
influences govcrnmt-• n ts' decisions on when and how to act outside 
of the DSU framework. That is, the institutional design of the DSU 
influences governments' decisions as to when they should v iolate 
the DSU. 
Specifically, the DSU's stalt-clnd-withdrcnv loophole creates a 
demand for trade retaliation outside of the DSU framework. 
Covernn1ents that find that the DSU's forward-looking rcrncdies, 
which do nol provide for compensation for economic damages that 
occur cl1 1ring the litigat ion process. are unsa tisfying will seek t lll 
a l ter-native. 1n addition, where the irnmediate effects of a viol<-�tion 
hr.we a significant economic impact on the injured state, domestic 
politice1l conditions may require domestic leaders to take action 
before the DSU p rocess can be concluded. 
rhe DSU's institutional design tjjectively permits such actions 
because, ironicaHy, it provides some cover for WTO i l legal 
retaliat ion. Just as other states cannot legally retaliate against the 
initial breach, retaliation in response lo that breach is entitled to the 
same protection. Thus both governments may be 1n breach of the 
WTO agreement but neither is legally al1owed to respond to Lhe 
other's violation before tl1e DSU process has been contpleted. In 
practice, this means that injured states can pursue a two-step 
enJorcement policy. They can retaliate immediately (and iUegally) 
for the perceived violations of one of their trading partners as well 
as pursue WTO litigation. This is one way to interpret the ongoing 
dispute between the United States and the EU over subsidies to 
Airbus and Boeing. Each has alleged the other unfairly subsidizes 
its aircraft manufacturing industry. Both goveTnments are 
arguably violating the WTO's rule on subsidies, but nonetheless 
each is retaliabng outside of the WTO framework while 
simultaneously pursuing a DSU ruling. These cases - the EU and 
Unilcd States have each filed a con1plaint against the other's 
practices - began in October 2004 and are still ongojng. 
Along the same lines, in 2007 the European Union actively 
considered a proposal, advocated by French President Jacques 
Chirac, to impose a carbon tax on imports from the United States 
unti l  such time as the United States joins the Kyoto Protocol. This 
imposition of a carbon tax on U.S. goods is arguably a violation of 
the WTO Agreement. The mostly likely response by the United 
States governn1ent, which is considering its own carbon duty on 
imports, to the EC actions would have been imposing a similar 
carbon tax on the goods from the EC (and perhaps other states as 
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well). One or both could also bring c1 vVTO case, but  more 
immediote measures are also in ei ther government's range of 
policy options. Indeed, the stall-and-wi thdraw loophole creates a 
need for more immediate, if i l legal, action. 
Fim 'll ly, goverrunents can retaliate using measures tl1at seen1 
tangential to the issue a t  hand, and yet be attempting to enforce 
trC�de rules outside of the WTO fr<lmewot·k. For instance, the 
United States government could respond to EU health and safety 
measures that the U.S. views as a viobtion of the WTO's Sanitary 
and Phytosan i tary ("SPS'') Agreement by increasing its inspections 
of EU agriculture exports or qt.1aranlining certa i n  products. The 
public may not recognize this as unila teral enforcemenl action and 
yet it  could influence the EU's irnplementation of health and safety 
measures. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The DSU has n1ade major strides in establishing a rule of law 
system for the adjudication of in ternational trade disputes. I n  
many ways, i t  i s  a n1odel for how dispute settlement institutions in 
other areas nught be designed; and yet, the DSU has its own 
institutional l imitations. The core legal principle of the DSU is tha t 
governm.ents forego u n i lateral trade enforcement in favor of a 
multilateral process, but the institutional design of the DSU has a 
different effect. The sb·ucture of the DSU creates a demand for 
unilateral retaliation by i nununizing breaches of the WTO 
agreernent during l i t igation. So long as the respondent 
government ·withdraws the measure after the DSU litigation is  
complete, WTO n1e1nber governments cannot legnlly respond to  the 
breach. In addition, th.e DSU syslem pern1its the unilateral 
retaliation the san1e legal immunity as the alleged breach. 
ConsequentlyJ a n  analysis of the DSU system has to balance the 
successes of the system i n  constraining unilateral action with the 
institutional design elements of the DSU that permit, if not 
encourage, unilateral action. 
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